



Record of Interview

Project Title and Code: SIGAR LL-02: Lessons Learned from Aid Coordination in Afghanistan				
Date: January 23, 2015				
Interviewees: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)				
SIGAR Attendees: Grant McLeod, Subject Matter Expert / Consultant				
Location: New York City				
Purpose: (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)				
Non- attribution Basis:				
Yes	X	No		
Recorded:				
Yes		No	X	
Recording File Record Number:				
Prepared By: Grant McLeod, Subject Matter Expert, Consultant				
Summary of Key Discussion:				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan was starting from nothing. There was no government, no administration, and no police. It was just Karzai and a few people. The international community and the Afghan government did not really sit down to say what to do and how; a long term plan was never there; lots of talk regarding a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan, but it did not occur; the gap assessment was good start, but small compared to nature of the need; approach to health and education were done well, but there was no employment. • Afghan Compact and ANDS – There were many interests in the development of the Compact and the development of the ANDS was complicated and involved too many actors. Many were trying to make their own careers. Every activity has a spillover and the strategy needed to consider everything as interconnected; selection of projects is the priority; issue was how much money needed; \$30 billion long term program was needed. • We could have made ANDS permanent with technical staff of its own with donors and national staff in an OMB type office; One overall fund administrated by joint board; The government could not absorb the activity. Capacity building was an issue, but there was no coordinated program. Afghan ex-pats could have been used instead of contractors; very little money went through Afghans. • IC never believed in any Afghan program even though they were consulted, their priorities were reflected, and they approved it. International community was implementing projects independently and not engaging Afghans; Less than 18% was spent on budget. • UNAMA was not strong enough; Donors would not surrender career on authority to UN; people wanted to build careers; work and results were said to be positive; donors control money and so control them; It was the US show as the biggest spender; • PRT soldiers did not know what to do. PRTs never engaged in overall development effort and there was no information sharing; they were not part of JCMB at first; donors wanted to raise their on flags; Germans got Kunduz; Italian got justice, etc. • JCMB was interested in politics; Ambassadors not interested in funding issues; JCMB should be delegated to the Assistant Ambassador level; reduce politics and increase economics; need to decide what the production of Afghan will be; minerals take long time. • The United States has done a great deal for Afghanistan, but they did not know the country. They were naïve. US needs reasonable attitude of what Afghan should do. 				
Follow-up:				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None 				